Limited liability creates a conflict of interests between policyholders and shareholders of insurance companies. It provides shareholders with incentives to increase the risk of the insurer's assets and liabilities which, in turn, might reduce the value policyholders attach to and premiums they are willing to pay for insurance coverage.
Introduction
Risk shifting is a well-known agency problem in corporate finance between shareholders and bondholders of a corporation (Jensen and Meckling [9] , Green [8] , MacMinn [10] ). The limited liability protection provides incentives for management acting in the interests of shareholders to select riskier projects at the expense of bondholders. If management cannot credibly commit not to undertake those projects, bondholders demand an appropriate interest rate differential which reflects the agency cost.
Policyholders of a stock insurance company face a situation similar to that of bondholders of a corporation. By paying premiums, policyholders provide capital which is senior to equity but under the investment decision of management acting in the interest of shareholders. Limited liability provides incentives for management to increase the risk of the insurer's assets and liabilities by, for example, increasing the risk of the asset portfolio, selling additional policies without a corresponding injection of equity, or by changing the reinsurance arrangements or strategies in asset liability management accordingly. This increase in the stock insurer's risk may raise the insolvency probability of the insurer and consequently reduce the value policyholders attach to and the premium they are willing to pay for the insurance contract.
We provide a formal framework to study the conflict of interest between risk-neutral shareholders of an insurance corporation and its risk-averse policyholders. Shareholders have access to a technology through which they can increase the risk of the insurer's assets. We represent the technology by the possibility of investing the total capital of the insurer, including equity and premium payments, in a risky asset. Different risk profiles of the insurer's assets are identified by different fractions of the insurer's total capital invested in the risky asset. While increasing the risk of the insurer's assets may serve shareholders' interests, it may reduce the premium levels policyholders are willing to pay and thereby the total capital available for shareholders to invest.
In this context, we characterize the set of Pareto optimal investment and premium policies.
We show that, for any policyholders' or shareholders' reservation utility level, there exists a Pareto optimum and, under some mild assumption, it is unique. Moreover, we specify the necessary and sufficient condition for the Pareto optimum.
We then investigate the risk shifting problem between shareholders and policyholders, that is, the setting in which shareholders cannot credibly commit to a specific investment strategy before policies are sold and premiums are paid. This agency problem generically leads to Pareto suboptimal investment policies and corresponding premium levels. The investment technology implies that the risk shifting problem admits only the boundary solution where the entire insurer's capital is invested in the risky asset.
Last, we analyze the effect of solvency regulation in the context of this agency problem. Solvency regulation imposes a constraint on the set of possible investment and premium policies. We model the regulatory constraint by some general convex risk measure and characterize the corresponding solution. We show that there exists a unique investment strategy and premium level that solves the risk shifting problem under the regulatory constraint and analyze its effect on the inefficiency of the risk shifting problem. Finally, we calibrate our model to an European Economic Area nonlife insurer average portfolio taken from the QIS3 (Quantitative Impact Study 3) Benchmarking Study [4] of the Chief Risk Officer Forum under the Solvency II standard model [2, 3] and illustrate our analytical results.
Our paper relates to the literature on the risk shifting problem in corporate finance (Jensen and Meckling [9] ). Green [8] presents a formal model in which entrepreneurs decide on the allocation of funds across two mutually non-exclusive projects where one project is riskier than the other in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz [18] . The investment technology exhibits some scale function which is strictly concave in the amount invested in each project. The author shows that the agency conflict leads to an overinvestment in the riskier project and discusses the role of convertible bonds in eliminating the risk shifting problem. MacMinn [10] analyzes the risk shifting problem with two mutually exclusive projects but with a linear scale function. The author shows that a sufficiently high level of leverage is necessary to induce the firm to switch from the less risky to the riskier project and thereby to generate an agency cost. Furthermore, there is a set of convertible contracts that eliminate the risk shifting problem. We contribute to this literature by analyzing the risk shifting problem in the insurance setting where the two parties have differing costs of bearing risk and which includes insurance losses as an additional source of risk. Moreover, we examine the effect of solvency regulation on the agency cost of the risk shifting problem. The investment technology in our model can be interpreted as two projects which are mutually non-exclusive (as in Green [8] ) and exhibit a linear scale function (as in MacMinn [10] ).
Our paper also relates to the insurance literature that discusses the conflicts of interest between shareholders and policyholders of a stock insurer. Mayers and Smith [12] , [13] discuss an agency problem in the context of dividend policies. After policies have been sold, shareholders have an incentive to increase the value of their claim by raising dividends at the expense of policyholders.
They argue that the mutual organizational form of an insurance company can help internalize this agency problem. Doherty [5] shows how an increase in the risk of the insurer's asset portfolio increases the shareholders' position at the expense of policyholders. We contribute to this literature by providing a formal model to investigate this conflict of interest and examine the effect of solvency regulation under the agency problem. This framework allows us to determine the specific conditions for existence and uniqueness of Pareto optimal risk structures and premium levels, for the solutions under the agency problem, and under solvency regulation.
Last, we contribute to the literature that analyzes the effect of regulation in insurance markets.
Munch and Smallwood [16] and Finsinger and Pauly [7] analyze the optimal amount of shareholder capital and investment risk of an insurance company under the assumption that shareholders cannot influence the risk structure of the insurer's assets and that insurance premiums are independent of the insurer's insolvency risk. Munch and Smallwood [16] argue that regulation may reduce the insolvency risk if shareholder capital is low. Finsinger and Pauly [7] , however, argue that regulation of insurance companies may be unnecessary in the long run with building up reserves.
McCabe and Witt [14] and MacMinn and Witt [11] analyze the effect of different regulatory schemes on the optimal investment and underwriting activity of an insurer under the assumption that the demand function for insurance is independent of the insurer's probability of insolvency.
Rees et al. [17] relax this assumption and show that if policyholders are fully informed about the insurer's insolvency risk then regulation serves no purpose. In our framework, shareholders decide on the investment strategy, policyholders are perfectly informed or, under the agency problem, have rational expectations about the corresponding risk, and premiums therefore depend on the implied insolvency risk. Moreover, we examine the effect of solvency regulation on the agency cost.
The paper is structured as follows. We set up our model in Section 2 and characterize the set of Pareto optimal policies in Section 3. In Section 4, we examine the risk shifting problem and solvency regulation. In Section 5, we calibrate our model to data and illustrate our results. We conclude in Section 6.
We consider a one-period economy with two agents, a policyholder and a shareholder. The policyholder is endowed with some initial wealth w 0 and faces a random loss X. His preferences are characterized by some Bernoulli utility function u : R → R.
The shareholder is risk-neutral. He owns a stock insurance company with initial capital c 0 > 0 which offers full insurance coverage for X in exchange for a premium p. The shareholder has access to a technology which allows him to increase the insurer's risk. We represent this technology by an investment opportunity in a risky asset that yields a random return R. The shareholder thus decides on the fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of the total capital, c 0 + p, to be invested in the risky asset. The risk-free interest rate is assumed to be zero or, equivalently, all values are in units of the risk-free numeraire. We assume that the shareholder has only access to the investment technology if he sells insurance. He may thus be willing to accept a negative premium p > −c 0 to gain access to the investment technology. We denote the set of investment and premium policies (α, p) by
The investment decision of the shareholder can be interpreted as an allocation decision of funds across two projects, a risk-free project with return zero and a risky project with random return R.
Moreover, the two projects are mutually non-exclusive (as in Green [8] ) and exhibit a linear scale function (as in MacMinn [10] ). For E [R] = 0, the project with return R is riskier in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz [18] . Allocating a higher fraction α of the total capital, c 0 + p, to the risky asset thus increases the risk of the insurer's assets and liabilities. This can be achieved, for example, by increasing the risk of the insurer's asset portfolio, by reducing the duration matching of assets and liabilities, or by increasing the attachment point of reinsurance contracts.
The end of the period surplus is given by (c 0 + p)(1 + αR) − X. If the surplus is negative, the insurance company is insolvent and the shareholder is protected by limited liability. In this case, the policyholder receives the remaining assets, (c 0 + p)(1 + αR). Consequently, the terminal payoff to the shareholder equals
while the terminal wealth of the policyholder is given by
The corresponding utility of the shareholder and the policyholder as a function of α and p is
respectively.
Assumption 2.1. Throughout the paper, we make the following standing assumptions: (iv) u and f are such that U SH and U P H are real-valued and differentiable in some neighborhood of P, and the following formal manipulations (e.g. changing the order of differentiation and integration) are meaningful. 1 Lemmas A.1-A.3 in the appendix illustrate the qualitative behavior of the shareholder and policyholder utility function on P. In the sequel we will draw on these results without further mention. From Lemma A.1 we know that U P H (1, p) is strictly concave in p. Hence there exists a unique critical premium level p crit P H ∈ [−c 0 , ∞) which maximizes the policyholder utility for α = 1,
We denote the corresponding critical shareholder and policyholder utility levels by γ crit SH = U SH (1, p crit P H ) and γ crit P H = U P H (1, p crit P H ), and define the intervals 2
Pareto Optimal Investment and Premium Policies
In this setup, we now examine optimal policies (α, p) ∈ P in the following sense:
Definition 3.1. The policy (α * , p * ) ∈ P is Pareto optimal if there does not exist any other policy
for at least one of them.
We first show that Pareto optimality is equivalent to a constrained optimization problem.
Theorem 3.2. For any policy (α * , p * ) ∈ P, the following are equivalent:
(i) (α * , p * ) is Pareto optimal.
(ii) (α * , p * ) solves the constrained optimization problem
for the shareholder's reservation utility level γ SH = U SH (α * , p * ), and γ SH ∈ Γ SH .
(iii) (α * , p * ) solves the constrained optimization problem
for the policyholder's reservation utility level γ P H = U P H (α * , p * ), and γ P H ∈ Γ P H . Moreover, in either of the above optimization problems, (1) and (2), the respective reservation utility constraint is binding.
Proof. (i)⇒(ii): let (α * , p * ) ∈ P be Pareto optimal. Then clearly (α * , p * ) solves the constrained optimization problem (1) . It remains to be shown that γ SH ∈ Γ SH . If (α * , p * ) = (1, p crit P H ) or if p crit P H = −c 0 then there is nothing to prove. So assume that (α * , p * ) = (1, p crit P H ) ∈ P. In view of Lemma A.3 (iv), we have U P H (α * , p * ) < U P H (1, p crit P H ). But then, by Pareto optimality of (α * , p * ), we must have γ SH = U SH (α * , p * ) > U SH (1, p crit P H ) = γ crit SH . This proves the claim.
(ii)⇒(i): let (α * , p * ) ∈ P be a maximizer of (1). We argue by contradiction and assume that (α * , p * ) is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists some policy (ᾱ,p) ∈ P such that U P H (ᾱ,p) ≥ U P H (α * , p * ) and U SH (ᾱ,p) ≥ γ SH = U SH (α * , p * ) with strict inequality for at least one of them. If U P H (ᾱ,p) > U P H (α * , p * ) then clearly (α * , p * ) cannot be an optimizer of (1). Hence we can assume that U SH (ᾱ,p) > γ SH and U P H (ᾱ,p) = U P H (α * , p * ). Then there exists a neighborhood O of (ᾱ,p)
in P such that U SH (α, p) ≥ γ SH for all (α, p) ∈ O. By Lemma A.2 below, ∇U P H (ᾱ,p) = 0, and
does not solve (1), which is absurd. Hence (α * , p * ) is Pareto optimal. Moreover, this shows that the reservation utility constraint U SH (α, p) ≥ γ SH is binding.
The equivalence (i)⇔(iii) follows similarly but simpler, since ∂ p U SH (α, p) > 0 by Lemma A.2.
Pareto optimal investment and premium policies can thus be generated by a take-it-or-leave-it offer either of the policyholder to the shareholder (optimization problem (1)) or of the shareholder to the policyholder (optimization problem (2)). The participation constraint is binding in either case because both the policyholder's and shareholder's preferences are locally non-satiated.
Note that part (ii) of Theorem 3.2 implies that there exists no Pareto optimal policy for a shareholder utility level γ SH / ∈ Γ SH . In fact, as for the existence of Pareto optimal policies, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3. For any reservation utility level γ SH ∈ Γ SH and γ P H ∈ Γ P H , respectively, there exists at least one Pareto optimum (α * , p * ) ∈ P with U SH (α * , p * ) = γ SH and U P H (α * , p * ) = γ P H , respectively. It satisfies the first order condition
(3)
Moreover, for any α * ∈ [0, 1] there exists at most one Pareto optimum.
Proof. In view of Theorem 3.2, it is enough to consider the optimization problems (1) and (2), respectively. First note that, in view of Lemmas A.1 and A.2, U P H (α, p) is strictly concave and
can be at most one Pareto optimum. Moreover, by Lemma A.3, we have Γ SH ⊆ U SH (P) and Γ P H = U P H (P). Hence the constraint sets in (1) and (2) are non-empty. Lemma A.3 (iii) implies that for any γ P H ∈ Γ P H the level set {U P H ≥ γ P H } ⊂ P is compact in P. Since U P H and U SH are continuous on P, we conclude that the maximum in both optimization problems (1) and (2), and thus the Pareto optimum at the respective reservation utility level, is attained in P.
For the derivation of the first order condition, it is convenient to introduce the following diffeomorphism:
Note that w is the total asset value of the insurer and v is the money invested in the stock market. The corresponding utility of the shareholder and the policyholder as a function of the new
For simplicity of notation, we use the same letter S(v, w) = S(α, p) for the respective solvency event.
We note that V SH is a convex and V P H is a concave function jointly in (v, w). In contrast, U SH and U P H do not share these properties as functions jointly in (α, p) in general.
By Lemma A.4, we have ∂ w V P H < 0. Hence, for any γ SH ∈ Γ SH , the implicit function theorem yields a continuously differentiable function W :
Since for every fixed α ∈ [0, 1] the function V SH (αw, w) = U SH (α, w − c 0 ) is strictly increasing in w and maps the interval (0, ∞) onto itself, we can assume that I = [0, v ] for some v > 0, and
We now characterize the critical points for the policyholder utility function along the level curve
Hence any Pareto optimal (v * , w * ) ∈ V satisfies
This proves (3).
In this theorem, we have shown the existence of Pareto optimal investment and premium policies for any admissible reservation utility level of the policyholder or the shareholder. This result is thus valid for different degrees of competition in the insurance market which can be represented by different reservation utility levels. A higher degree of competition in the insurance market is reflected by a lower reservation utility level of the shareholder. In a perfectly competitive market, the shareholder reservation utility level is given by γ SH = c 0 , derived from his outside option of not selling insurance.
In the following theorem, we specify the condition under which the Pareto optimum is unique and under which the first order condition (3) is also sufficient. Moreover, the first order condition (3) is also sufficient for Pareto optimality of (α * , p * ) ∈ P.
Proof. We use the (v, w)-coordinates as introduced in the proof of Theorem 3.3. Fix γ SH ∈ Γ SH , and let W : I → (0, ∞) be the corresponding level curve as in the proof of Theorem 3.3. In view of (5) and (6), the second derivative of
which under the assumption of the theorem is negative. Indeed, both summands on the right hand side are non-positive. If the insolvency event has positive probability,
) is strictly concave in v ∈ I. This proves the theorem.
In the proof of this theorem, it is shown that, under very mild assumptions, the policyholder's utility as a function of α along a shareholder's level curve, U SH (α, p) = γ SH , can only assume three shapes. Either it is strictly decreasing in which case α * = 0 is the Pareto optimal investment policy. Or it is strictly increasing in which case α * = 1 is the Pareto optimal investment policy.
Last, it can take a unique inner maximum 0 < α * < 1 and is strictly increasing to the left and strictly decreasing to the right. In each of these three cases, the Pareto optimal premium policy p * is uniquely defined by U SH (α * , p * ) = γ SH .
3 The differentiation under the expectation sign is justified by Assumption 2.1, see the proof of Lemma A.2 below.
Remark 3.5. Along similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.4, but under the more stringent assumption that E R 1 S(α,p) > 0 for all (α, p) ∈ P, one can show that also the shareholder's utility along a policyholder's level curve, U P H = γ P H , can only assume the afore mentioned three shapes: increasing, decreasing, or first increasing and then decreasing. 4 Again, the respective Pareto optimal policy is uniquely defined.
We terminate this section with a generic example where there exists no inner Pareto optimum (α * , p * ) ∈ P with investment policy α * > 0.
Example 3.6. For this example we assume that (i) X and R are independent,
In particular, the assumption in Theorem 3.4 is satisfied. Now fix an arbitrary policy (α, p) ∈ P with α > 0. We claim that
This together with the first order condition (3) and Theorem 3.4 then implies that the set of all Pareto optimal policies in P is given by
For the proof of (7) we first observe that
. Further one can show that
From this we conclude that d 2
Hence every critical point is a local maximum. This shows that V SH (v, W (v)) has the desired properties.
with strict inequalities on S(α, p) c ∩ {R > 0} and S(α, p) c ∩ {R < 0}, respectively. Hence
which proves (7) .
Risk Shifting and Solvency Regulation
In this section, we focus in our analysis of the risk shifting problem on a competitive insurance market. The shareholder is therefore held at his reservation utility level which is derived from his outside option of not selling insurance. We assume that the shareholder has only access to the investment technology if he sells insurance. The shareholder's participation constraint is thus given by U SH (α, p) ≥ c 0 . 5 Assumption 4.1. Throughout this section, we make the following standing assumptions:
In this case, the assumption in Theorem 3.4 is satisfied. 5 Although we focus on a competitive insurance market, we show that all results also hold under the dual problem with the policyholder's participation constraint. The results are thus valid for different degrees of competition.
Proof. It follows by inspection that E R 1 {X≤c0+p} ≤ E R 1 S(α,p) for all (α, p) ∈ P. In view of Lemma A.2, Assumption 4.1(ii) implies (8) . Conversely, that (8) implies (ii) follows from setting α = 0 in (8) . Moreover, it follows that the assumption in Theorem 3.4 is satisfied. We now consider the following sequence of events. The policyholder pays a premium p in exchange for full insurance coverage of X. The shareholder then decides on the fraction α of the total capital, c 0 + p, to be invested in the risky asset.
If the shareholder can commit to an investment policy α before the insurance premium p is paid, then the optimal investment and premium policy is given by the solution to the following optimization problem:
for the shareholder's reservation utility level γ SH = c 0 . By Theorem 3.2 and Assumption 4.1, the solution to (9) is Pareto optimal.
We now examine the situation in which the shareholder cannot credibly commit to an investment policy α before the insurance premium p is paid. That is, after the policyholder has paid the insurance premium p, the shareholder chooses α by solving the following optimization problem:
By Lemma 4.2, for any fixed p ∈ (−c 0 , ∞), U SH (α, p) is strictly increasing in α. Hence only the boundary solution is possible, i.e. arg max α U SH (α, p) = 1. The shareholder invests the entire total capital in the risky asset. 6 The policyholder has rational expectations about this investment strategy and the premium p has to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint that the shareholder sets the investment strategy according to optimization problem (10) . We can thus formalize the agency problem by the following constrained optimization problem:
for the shareholder's reservation utility level γ SH = c 0 . In view of Theorem 3.2 (ii), any solution of the risk shifting problem (11) is generically Pareto suboptimal.
In the following theorem, we characterize the solution and show that it can be equivalently 
respectively. This solution satisfiesᾱ = 1, and U SH (1,p) = γ SH and U P H (1,p) = γ P H , respec-
Moreover, any solution (ᾱ,p) to (11) with γ SH = U SH (ᾱ,p) ∈ Γ SH is a solution to (12) with γ P H = U P H (ᾱ,p) ∈ Γ P H , and vice versa.
Proof. As seen below (10), for any fixed p ∈ (−c 0 , ∞), we have arg max α U SH (α , p) = 1. Hence 6 There is only the boundary solution under the risk shifting problem in our setting due to two features of the investment technology. First, any fraction α ∈ [0, 1] can be invested in the risky asset. Second, the investment technology exhibits a linear scale function, i.e., there are no costs other than the agency cost involved in shifting risk. A strictly concave scale function, as assumed in Green [8] with mutually non-exclusive projects, would imply that the shareholder overinvests in risk but not necessarily up to the boundary. 7 The results thus also apply to other degrees of competition, including a monopolistic insurance market which is given by the policyholder's reservation utility level derived from his outside option of not buying insurance, i.e. respectively.
The inefficiency of the investment and premium policy arises if shareholders cannot credibly commit to an investment strategy before premiums are paid. Any credible commitment device for shareholders would thus increase welfare. In the context of corporate finance, Green [8] and
MacMinn [10] have shown that issuing convertible bonds can provide such a commitment device and eliminate the risk shifting problem.
In our context of insurance there are also various contractual and organizational features that might provide some form of commitment device. Shareholders can limit the insurer's risk exposure by including restrictions on their investment and dividend policies in their corporate charter.
Shareholders could also transfer parts of their assets to an escrow account. These restrictions limit the extent to which shareholders can increase the insurer's risk structure and thereby reduce the inefficiency caused by the risk shifting problem. Along the lines of convertible bonds, participating policies reduce the benefit to shareholders from increasing the insurer's risk. The implied benefit of partially overcoming the risk shifting problem might outweigh the cost of higher exposure for policyholders to the insurer's risk. Last, changing the organizational form to a mutual form would eliminate the risk shifting problem. Under the mutual form, owners who decide on the insurer's risk structure coincide with providers of capital. The incentive problem is thereby eliminated at the cost of less diversified owners.
In the following, we take the insurance contract as given and explore the effect of solvency This capital requirement restricts the set of feasible investment and premium policies. Solvency capital requirement can thus be interpreted as a commitment device for shareholders imposed by the regulator.
The risk shifting problem (11) under this additional regulatory constraint is as follows
for the shareholder's reservation utility level γ SH = c 0 .
We make the following standard assumptions for risk measures, see e.g. McNeil et al. [15] . (ii) ρ is convex, that is,
for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and random losses L, L .
The cash-invariance property of ρ is motivated by its interpretation as regulatory capital requirement. Adding a deterministic cash amount c to the position, the capital requirement is reduced by the same amount. The economic idea behind the convexity assumption of ρ is that diversification by means of combining risks reduces overall risk and therefore the capital requirement.
This assumption is crucial for the constrained problem (13) L(α, p) ) > c 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1]. 8 Since the shareholder prefers great α, that is, ∂ α U SH > 0, we have that α ρ (p) equals the arg max in the regulatory constrained subproblem in (13) given that it
Hence the domain D α = {p ∈ (−c 0 , ∞) | α ρ (p) > −∞} of α ρ is either empty or an interval with sup D α = ∞. We define the corresponding intervals of feasible utility levels
Here is our existence and uniqueness result for the regulatory constrained risk shifting problem (13) . Proof. We argue in the (v, w)-coordinates introduced in the proof of Theorem 3.3, and define the corresponding regulator's risk measurement function
In view of Lemmas 4.2 and A.4, we know that ∂ v V SH > 0. Hence, any solution (v,ŵ) to (13) or (14) must be of the formv = v ρ (ŵ).
We claim that v ρ is a non-decreasing function on (0, ∞). Indeed, arguing by contradiction, By assumption, D is a non-empty interval with sup D = ∞. We now analyze the properties of the policy-and shareholder utility functions along the curve (v ρ (w), w) for w ∈ D. First, we claim that V P H (v ρ (w), w) is strictly quasiconcave and continuous in w ∈ D. Indeed, let w 1 < w 2 < w 3 be points in D.
Since v ρ is concave and non-decreasing, there exists some λ ∈ (0, 1) such that v ρ (w 2 ) = λv ρ (w 1 ) + (1 − λ)v ρ (w 3 ) and w 2 ≤ λw 1 + (1 − λ)w 3 . From this, and since ∂ w V P H < 0, we derive
On the other hand, the policyholder utility function, V P H (a + bw, w), is strictly concave along straight lines of the form (a + bw, w) ∈ V, for constant parameters a and b. 9 Hence
We thus obtain and V SH (v ρ (w), w) may fail to be continuous in w. Therefore the maximum of (13) or (14) may not be attained. and the regulatory constraint set in (13) . That is,
The maximizer (α,p) of (13) satisfies U P H (α,p) ≥ U P H (α ,p ).
We now consider the effect of solvency regulation on the agency cost by comparing the invest- In the proof of Theorem 3.4, we have shown that this function can only assume three possible shapes. It is either strictly increasing, or strictly decreasing, or attains a global maximum at a unique critical point α * ∈ [0, 1] and is strictly increasing to the left and strictly decreasing to the right of α * .
If the policyholder's utility along the shareholder's respective level curve is strictly increasing in α, then the investment policy under the risk shifting problem without solvency regulation,ᾱ = 1, is Pareto optimal, i.e. α * =ᾱ = 1. Solvency regulation by limiting the investment policy toα withα < α * =ᾱ = 1 reduces the policyholder's utility and thus welfare.
If the policyholder's utility along the shareholder's respective level curve attains a global maximum at a unique critical point α * ∈ [0, 1), the risk shifting problem leads to a welfare loss. If solvency regulation implies an investment levelα which is higher than the Pareto optimal level, i.e. if α * ≤α <ᾱ = 1, then the policyholder's utility and thus welfare is higher under the regulatory constraint. This is because the policyholder's utility is strictly decreasing for all α ≥ α * . If solvency regulation is tighter and implies an investment level which is lower than the Pareto optimal level, i.e. if α < α * <ᾱ = 1, then the impact of the regulatory constraint on welfare is ambiguous. This is because the policyholder's utility is strictly increasing for all α ≤ α * . In particular, for very tight solvency regulation that restricts the set of investment policies to very low levels, regulation can even further reduce welfare relative to the risk shifting problem without regulation.
In view of the dual problem in Theorem 4.6, the welfare effect of solvency regulation can be analogously discussed by comparing the shareholder's utility as a function of α ∈ [0, 1] along the policyholder's respective level curve. Since this function can also only assume the same three shapes (see Remark 3.5), we obtain the qualitatively identical results.
In this section we first calibrate our model to the average portfolio of an European Economic Area non-life insurer taken from the Quantitative Impact Study 3 (QIS3) Benchmarking Study [4] of the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) Forum. From these data we derive all exogenous model parameters in our model. In particular, we determine the initial capital c 0 and the stochastic model for market risk R and insurance risk X. We then use our numerical findings to illustrate our analytical results. 
for some representative premium p 0 to be determined below, and the representative investment policy α 0 = 1/7. 11 The Solvency II stand alone capital requirement for insurance risk equals SCR ins = VaR 99.5% insurance loss = X − p 0 .
The Solvency II test demands that the available capital, c 0 , be greater than or equal to the total solvency capital requirement, SCR tot . We henceforth assume that
We now specify the stochastic model for market investment risk R and insurance risk X. We assume that
where (Y, Z) is jointly normally distributed with mean (µ Y , µ Z ), standard deviations σ Y , σ Z , and a linear correlation of −0.25. 12 Furthermore, we assume that
We use the following premium calculation principle to calibrate the insurance risk parameters
In solving Equations (15)- (19) we determine the parameters that fully specify our model (c 0 , µ Y ,
As for the policyholder's utility function, we assume constant absolute risk aversion. 14 Thus, the policyholder's expected utility is
where β denotes the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
Our numerical results are presented in Figures 1, 2 (ES), respectively. The policies that are acceptable to the regulator are to the north-west of these boundaries. We note that the value-at-risk, VaR 99.5% , does not satisfy the convexity property in Assumption 4.5 in general, see e.g. McNeil et al. [15] . However, in our example it shows convex behavior for the relevant values of (α, p). For comparison, we also consider the Swiss Solvency Test [1] regulatory risk measure, which is the expected shortfall 15 , ES 99% , at the 99% confidence level.
The expected shortfall satisfies all properties of Assumption 4.5. Figure 4 shows the regulatory constraints under the expected shortfall measure ES q at different confidence levels q = 99, 90, and 60. In a frictionless market with perfect competition the optimal investment and premium strategy (α * , p * ) will be obtained at point PC. However, if shareholders cannot credible commit to an investment strategy the optimal solution (ᾱ,p) is attained at the risk shifted solution RS withᾱ = 1 as implied by Theorem 4.4. This is harmful to the policyholder since the policyholder's utility decreases as (α, p) moves away from the PC along the shareholder's reservation utility curve. In this case regulation helps. Regulation restricts the set of feasible premium and investment strategies and might keep the shareholder from excessive risk taking. According to Theorem 4.6 there exists a unique solution (α,p) for the regulated risk shifting problem. For different confidence levels these solutions are labeled R99, R90, and R60, respectively. 16 As can be seen from Figure 4 , regulation improves efficiency under the risk shifting problem for confidence levels q ∈ [99, 90, 60]. Among the regulatory measures presented in Figure 4 , ES 90% is optimal.
Solvency requirements are too tight for ES 99% and too weak for ES 60% .
We have chosen constant absolute risk aversion because it eliminates wealth effects from our analysis. Unfortunately, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is difficult to interpret since most empirical studies on estimating risk aversion are based on the assumption of constant relative risk aversion. Nevertheless, we can observe the behavior of the Pareto optimal point under perfect competition. We find that, with increasing degree of risk aversion β, the optimal investment in the stock market reduces while the optimal premium level increases. Moreover, in our example, the expected shortfall measure implies a more stringent regulatory requirement than the one implied by the value-at-risk measure. For lower degrees of risk aversion, β = 10 and β = 30, the Pareto optimal policies do not satisfy the regulatory constraints. For higher degrees of risk aversion, e.g. β = 130, PC meets the regulatory requirements.
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a formal framework to analyze the conflict of interest policyholders and shareholders of insurance companies face. Increasing the risk of the insurer's assets and liabilities raises shareholder value potentially at the expense of policyholders. We characterize investment strategies and premium policies under Pareto optimality, under the risk shifting problem, and under solvency regulation. Moreover, we analyze the effect of solvency regulation on the agency cost of the risk shifting problem.
Solvency capital requirements limit the set of possible risk structures and thereby provide a commitment device for shareholders imposed by the regulator. There are other possible contractual or organizational arrangements that serve as commitment devices and thus reduce the agency cost. Examples include investment and dividend policy restrictions in corporate charters, issuing participating policies, or changing the organizational form to a mutual insurance company. While these contractual arrangements reduce the agency cost of the risk shifting problem they add other trade-offs. In this paper, we took the insurance contract as given and explored how solvency 16 The numerical values for α, p and U P H at points of interest can be looked up in Table 1 .
regulation might address the risk shifting problem without distorting insurance contracts.
A Appendix: Lemmas
is convex in α and in p.
(ii) U P H (α, p) is concave in α and strictly concave in p.
Proof. For fixed R = r and X = x, the function ((c 0 + p)(1 + αR) − X) + is convex in p and in α.
is concave in p and in α, and strictly concave in p for solvency states X ≤ (c 0 + p)(1 + αR). Taking expectation preserves these properties since
Lemma A.2. The derivatives of U SH and U P H are given by:
Proof. We can write (iv) U P H attains its global supremum at (1, p crit P H ) . That is, That is, on the shareholder level curve γ SH = c 0 . In this setting the Pareto optimal policy (α * , p * ) is labeled with PC, the risk shifted solution is denoted by RS, and the solutions to the regulated risk shifting problem for different confidence levels are marked with R99, R90, and R60, respectively. α p U P H (α, p) PC = (α * , p * ) 0.347 0.883 -1.00E-06 R99 = (α ES 99% ,p ES 99% ) 0.102 0.893 -1.14E-06 R90 = (α ES 90% ,p ES 90% ) 0.204 0.890 -1.02E-06 R60 = (α ES 60% ,p ES 60% ) 0.531 0.869 -1.31E-06 RS = (ᾱ,p) 1 0.824 -4.21E-05 Table 1 : This Table shows the values of the policy (α, p) and the implied utility of the policyholder for points of interest marked in Figure 4 .
